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I. APPROACHING VoIP
The proposition is simple. Things that appear the same should be
regulated the same. This would seem fair; the syllogism is sound. Phone
services provide two-way, real-time voice communications. Phone services
are regulated. Therefore things that provide two-way, real-time voice
communications should be regulated.
But modernists teach us that how a thing is perceived depends upon
perspective. There may be many perspectives of a horse. If I am an
equestrian, I might view the horse one way. If I am a hungry mountain lion,
I might have a different view. If, however, I am a hockey player, I might
have no regard for the horse at all. Which is the correct perspective?
There are many perspectives on Voice over Internet Protocol
("VoIP") service. The Functional Approach concludes that the appropriate
perspective is from a functional standpoint. If a device performs the same
technical function as a telephone, then it should receive the same regulatory
treatment as a telephone. But why? Is the technology the reason that the
regulations exist? Is there some Platonic nature of telephones such that
filing tariffs is simply a part of the form of being a phone?' If policy
1. Plato proposed that a thing has its own innate form through which it reveals itself.
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objectives concern markets, perhaps markets is the appropriate standpoint.
If the policy objectives concern public safety or threats to revenue, perhaps
those are the appropriate standpoints.
But this Article disappoints. Pablo Picasso offered multiple
perspectives of a horse, refusing to give us a desired definitive viewpoint.
The notion of this Article is not to resolve the definitive approach to VoIP.
Rather, this Article suggests that the process of the approach has itself
become muddled. Individuals quibble, contrasting the superiority of one
perspective over another, negating the reason why they were looking in the
first place.
To successfully view the horse, first, we must know why we are
looking at the horse. Then we must decide how to look at the horse; we
must define what "it" is that we are looking at. Finally, we need to consider
whether what we looked at is consistent with why we were looking. If a
dentist seeks to care for the horse's teeth, looking at a horse's rear end
probably means the approach is a bit askew.
Policy likewise involves process dynamic. The first question is (A)
"why": what are the objectives, goals, and concerns-the policy's first
principles. The next question is (B) "how". With what approach will the
policy be implemented; what is (and is not) the target of the policy. Finally,
(C) does the outcome comport with the policy goals.
Goals Goals
bjectives Objectives
Outcome Implementation Outcome Implemen ation
o~o ach A oroach
The intelligible world contains the eternal "Forms" (in Greek, idea) of things; the
visible world is the imperfect and changing manifestation in this world of these
unchanging forms. For example, the "Form" or "Idea" of a horse is intelligible,
abstract, and applies to all horses; this Form never changes, even though horses
vary wildly among themselves-the Form of a horse would never change even if
every horse in the world were to vanish. An individual horse is a physical,
changing object that can easily cease to be a horse (if, for instance, it's dropped
out of a fifty story [sic] building); the Form of a horse, or "horseness," never
changes. As a physical object, a horse only makes sense in that it can be referred
to the "Form" or "Idea" of horseness.
Richard Hooker, Greek Philosophy: Plato (last modified June 6, 1999), at
http://www.wsu.edu:8080/-dee/GREECE/PLATO.HTM.
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The notion of this Article is that we have confused VolP (B)
implementation/approaches with (A) policy objectives. Instead of asking
whether (C) outcome comports with (A) policy, we ask whether (C)
outcome comports with (B) implementation/approaches-and receive a
meaningless answer. So accustomed have we become to the environment
of implementation that we have forgotten why policy exists. We have taken
century-old frameworks, sought to apply them to novel situations, and
cannot resolve outcomes that appear "artificial." We quibble about why one
approach is superior to the other, without recognition of policy objectives
and without comprehension that the approach itself provides no coherent
rationale for its own outcome.
Approaches are artificial frameworks used to facilitate efficient policy
implementation. They are used to discern what falls within a regulatory
program. They are lines drawn in sand that do not themselves inform the
observer why the line was drawn at its particular location. The superiority
of the Functional Approach, the Technical Approach, or the Layered Model
cannot be resolved in and of themselves because we are contrasting
implementations without discussing policy goals. To properly resolve VoIP
policy, one must move beyond implementation and consider the whole
horse.
This Article is the second part of a project to survey and analyze state
VolP policy. The first part of the project surveyed state VoIP regulatory
activity.2 This part seeks to place that precedent in a centrifuge, segregating
out different groupings of precedent. The object was to observe whether
different patterns or lessons might emerge. The results were plentiful. This
Article represents one set of the observations.3
A. The Genesis of Approaches
In 1998, the FCC released the Steven's Report to Congress.4 In this
report, the FCC articulated what would become known as the Functional
Approach for discerning whether Internet telephony services should be
considered telecommunications services. The Steven's Report did not,
however, materialize out of the ether. It was a rearticulation of the policy
2. The survey results can be found at Cybertelecom: VoIP: States, at
http://www.cybertelecom.org/voip/states.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
3. This Article is limited in scope to state precedent as articulated in state proceedings
and does not examine views expressed in FCC proceedings.
4. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R.
11,501 (1998), at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/fcc98067.html
[hereinafter Steven's Report]. The report is nicknamed after its author, Senator Ted
Stevensof Alaska.
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that currently existed: the Computer Inquiries.
5
The Computer Inquiries were initiated in 1966 when the FCC began
to ponder computers in the network.6 There were computers which ran the
networks, and there were computers with which people interacted over the
networks. The FCC set to the task of studying these computer things and
the appropriate regulatory response. After all, AT&T, pursuant to a judicial
order, could only offer regulated telecommunications services. If these
computers with which people interacted were not regulated
"telecommunications services," AT&T could not offer those services. 7 In
addition, computer services, which included "big iron" main frame
computers that could be accessed remotely and promised economic
expansion, were dependent upon the underlying telecommunications
services. 8 Those computer services were also potentially (unregulated)
substitute services for telecommunications services (unregulated e-mails
were then substitute services for regulated Title II telegraph carriers in
much the same way that unregulated VolP services today are substitute
services for regulated Title I telephone services). Telephone carriers, for
their part, had the advantage of rate-payer paid for main frame computers
running the networks, which could be offered up for data processing
services during off-peak hours. 9 Telephone carriers therefore positioned
themselves as both supplier to and competitor of computer services.
Devising an appropriate policy approach to these different computers
would be an undertaking of wonder and it is no wonder that it took the FCC
two tries to get it right. The first principles of the policy were markets and
competition. Computer services were exciting, competitive, and innovative
players with promise of great wonder. The FCC perceived no reason to
regulate them. 10 The telephone network was a vital resource necessary to
the country and it was a monopoly. The FCC perceived that regulating
5. See Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the FCC's Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM.
L.J. 167 (2003), available at http://law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v55/no2/cannon.pdf.
6. See Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communications Serv. & Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1966) [hereinafter
Computer ! NOI].
7. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956). See
also United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987), affd, 900 F.2d 283
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
8. See Computer I NOI, supra note 6, para. 7.
9. See generally Delbert D. Smith, The Interdependence of Computer and
Communications Services and Facilities: A Question of Federal Regulation, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 829 (1969) (discussing interdependence between data processing services and
communication networks).
10. Regulation and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computerand
Comm. Servs., Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, paras. 19-23, (1970) [hereinafter
Computer I Tentative Decision].
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those computers was necessary in order to assure an open network.11 But
was there a reasonable approach that could distinguish these computers
from those?
In Computer I, the FCC implemented its policy with a troubled
approach. The implementation focused on technical computer processing,
attempting to divine the difference between circuit or message switching,
and data processing. 12 The framework that the FCC constructed
distinguished between "pure communications" and "pure data
processing." 13 Pure communications was content transmitted over the
network transparently with no change in content or form to the message.14
Pure data processing was, to put it simply, computer processing.
15
Unfortunately, this did not neatly divide the world; "communications"
increasingly utilized "computer processing." This grey area became known
as "hybrids."' 16 The FCC would resolve the classification hybrids on an ad
hoc, case-by-case basis. 17 But this approach was not viable as hybrids
quickly subsumed the rule. The approach failed to efficiently distinguish
these computers from those computers and placed the FCC in the position
of conducting a full evaluation for each new scenario.
The FCC recognized its predicament, disposed of the Computer I
approach, and initiated Computer I. 18 The policy objectives remained the
same but the FCC needed to construct a new implementation.
Computer II divided the world into basic and enhanced services.
19
These services were defined in functional terms. The services lived in
distinct markets. Network infrastructure service could be provided by one
company. Computer network services could be provided by another
company. The policy concerns for these different markets were different.
11. Regulation and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Comm. Servs., Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, para. 30 (1971) [hereinafter
Computer I Final Decision].
12. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations, Final
Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, para. 17, (1980) [hereinafter Computer H Final Decision].
13. Computer & Commun. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
14. See Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 10, para. 15(b).
15. Id. para. 15(a). "The use of a computer for the processing of information as
distinguished from circuit or message-switching. 'Processing' involves the use of the
computer for operations which include, inter alia, the functions of storing, retrieving,
sorting, merging and calculating data, according to programmed instructions."
16. Id. para. 15(e). "Hybrid Service-an offering of service which combines Remote
Access data processing and message-switching to form a single integrated service."
17. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 11, at paras. 27, 31-38. See Computer I
Tentative Decision, supra note 10, at paras. 39-45.
18. See Amendment of § 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations, Notice of
Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 61 F.C.C.2d 103 (1976).
19. Computer ! Final Decision, supra note 12, para. 86.
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Computer rs policy concern remained constant: there was no
compelling justification to regulate competitive enhanced services. 20
However, basic service that was offered by monopolies (AT&T, GTE, and
other incumbents in their respective markets) could discriminate and
engage in anticompetitive behavior. The FCC, therefore, regulated basic
services for the benefit of enhanced services, creating an open
communications platform.
2 1
In the Computer Inquiries, the FCC first established its policy. It
implemented that policy one way. That did not work. It implemented the
policy another way. That approach has produced outcomes consistent with
policy objectives for almost forty years. That approach was affirmed by the
Steven's Report, the FCC's first articulation on VoIP. To understand this
jurisprudence, one must understand the dynamic and distinction between
policy, approach, and outcome.
B. The Functional Approach
In 1997, Congress required22 the FCC to file the Steven's Report,
23
examining the interaction between information services (a.k.a. "enhanced
services"), telecommunications services (a.k.a. "basic services"), 24 and
universal service, and whether the increased use of unregulated (read,
"doesn't pay universal service fees") information services might pose a
threat to the Universal Service Fund. Among other items, the Steven's
Report turned its attention to the appropriate treatment of "Internet
telephony." In so doing, the FCC articulated the Functional Approach: "the
classification of a service under the 1996 Act depends on the functional
nature of the end-user offering.
'
,25
20. Note that while the FCC did not exercise jurisdiction, it did claim jurisdiction and
thereby preempted the states from imposing regulations on enhanced service providers.
21. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations, Tentative
Decision and Further Notice of Inquiry and Rulemaking, 72 F.C.C.2d 358, para. 125 (1979).
22. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 623, 111 Stat. 2440, 2521-2522
(1997).
23. Steven's Report, supra note 4.
24. The Telecommunications Act adopted the Functional Approach of the Computer
Inquiries (without codifying the policy) by setting forth the definitions of
telecommunications and information service. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20), (43) (2000). "We
concluded in the Non-Accounting Safeguards Order that, although the text of the
Commission's definition of 'enhanced services' differs from the 1996 Act's definition of
'information services,' the two terms should be interpreted to extend to the same functions."
Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision Of
Enhanced Services, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040, para. 40
(1998), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-98-8A 1 .pdf.
25. Steven's Report, supra note 4, para. 86.
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The FCC distinguished between phone-to-phone VolP, computer-to-
computer VoIP, and VolP software with no service provider. The FCC
looked "under the hood" of the service and selected different "salient
features' 26 that demarcated the boundary between those services that fall
within policy concerns and those that do not.
In using the term "phone-to-phone" IP telephony, we tentatively intend
to refer to services in which the provider meets the following
conditions: (1) it holds itself out as providing voice telephony or
facsimile transmission service; (2) it does not require the customer to
use [Customers Premises Equipment] different from that CPE
necessary to place an ordinary touch-tone call (or facsimile
transmission) over the public switched telephone network; (3) it allows
the customer to call telephone numbers assigned in accordance with
the North American Numbering Plan, and associated international
agreements; and (4) it trnsmits customer information without net
change in form or content.
This is a description of select technical components of a service. This
litmus test has been used repeatedly over time: if a service meets all of
these specifications, then it presumably is telecommunications service. If it
fails any one of the specifications, then it is not.
1. Legal Approach (Application of State Law)
Closely associated with the Functional Approach is what might be
called the Legal Approach, the straightforward application of statutory
definitions. Many jurisdictions have codified the Functional Approach in
their statutory definitions of telecommunications service. In several
instances observed below, jurisdictions confronted with VoIP policy
considerations have relied on statutory definitions without further
deliberation.
2. The States
The following are instances of state regulatory activity that embrace
the Functional Approach.
a. Non Cases-in-Controversy
Four states have had non case-in-controversy 28 proceedings that have
26. The phrases "under the hood" and "salient features" are borrowed from
Commissioner Stan Wise. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.a.ii (discussing Commissioner
Wise's testimony on behalf of NARUC).
27. Steven's Report, supra note 4, para. 88.
28. A case-in-controversy is a proceeding in which a policy decision will be provided
or a litigation will be resolved. Non case-in-controversy proceedings are not binding, do not
resolve policy, and do not resolve disputes between parties. Examples of these include
(Vol. 57
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embraced the Functional Approach. Each of these proceedings is a
fascinating case study of the application of the Functional Approach. The
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners ("NARUC")
contrasts the Functional Approach to the Technical Approach in a manner
adopted by this Article. Florida demonstrates the tension of adopting the
Functional Approach without comprehending the rationale behind the
approach. Finally, Missouri and California present paradigm examples of
jurisdictions that conducted an investigation, identified the policy concerns
and objectives, and then implemented an approach consistent with those
concerns.
i. Florida
In 2000, Florida released a white paper entitled Internet Pricing:
Regulatory Implications and Future Issues in which Florida embraced the
Functional Approach:
Looking forward, a key question to be resolved is whether VoIP
providers qualify as telecommunications carriers, or as information
service providers (or ESPs). Fundamental to this question is whether a
service provided over the Internet that appears functionally similar to a
traditionally-regulated service should3be subject to existing regulatory
requirements of traditional telephony.
The Article then reviews the Steven's Report articulation of the Functional
Approach and recounts the Steven's Report distinction between computer-
to-computer telephone and phone-to-phone telephone. 31 However, the
Florida White Paper struggles to discern a rationale for the differing
treatment:
It seems that the FCC made an artificial distinction between the
location at which the packetizing occurs and the technology used to
make the initial connection from the subscriber line. Thus, if it emits a.
stream of IP digital packets over a computer, it is not subject to
common carrier regulation, and hence access charges do not apply; if it
[emits] a Pulse Code Modulator (PCM) encoded digital bit stream, it's
a phone and [it is] subject to the common carrier regulation and
therefore access charges apply.
32
The Florida White Paper embraces the Functional Approach, but then is
confounded by the outcome. Florida is embracing an implementation
investigations, inquiries, and reports.
29. Florida Public Service Commission White Paper on Internet Pricing: Regulatory
Implications and Future Issues (Sept. 25, 2000), at
http://www.psc.state.fl.us/general/publications/paiPDF/internetpricing.pdf [hereinafter
Florida White Paper].
30. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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without understanding the policy goals and, therefore, cannot resolve the
results.33 The Florida White Paper concludes that the implementation is
"artificial." This is an astute observation that misses the point; all
approaches are artificial. Approaches are the implementation of policy, not
the policy itself.
ii. NARUC
NARUC advocates a Functional Approach. A NARUC statement
reveals a fascinating contrast between the Functional Approach and the
Technical Approach.
NARUC's resolutions on VOIP emphasize that regulatory treatment
should follow from the functional nature of a service, not the way it
works under the hood. Rather than looking to the technology itself,
policymakers should look at the salient features of a service. In most
cases, the starting point in our analysis should be what it is to the34
consumer.
As presented here, the Technical Approach looks under the hood to a
specific characteristic. Yet, the Functional Approach is likewise described
as looking at specific "salient features," also known as characteristics. Both
are technical approaches. The distinction appears to be which and how
many salient features one looks at. If policy is based on one characteristic,
for example the use of the VoIP protocol, that would appear to be the
Technical Approach. If policy is based on a collage of salient features, that
would appear to be the Functional Approach (in either approach, the
question is begged of how one determines which features are salient and
which are not).
Interestingly, NARUC is not entirely comfortable with the Functional
Approach. By the end of the testimony, the gears have been shifted to
concerns over market principles:
The "functional nature" approach does not mean regulating new VoIP
services just as if they were traditional circuit-switched service from
Ma Bell. Rather it means a rigorous, intellectually honest dialogue
about which public interest obligations are attached to which features
of a particular service. If the physical structure of a particular service
makes its carrier unable to exert market power, for example, that may
impact whether the full panoply of economic regulations should
33. The Florida legislature subsequently resolved uncertainty by declaring that it is in
the public interest that VolP not be regulated; in other words, Florida appears to follow the
Technical Approach, not the Functional Approach. See discussion infra Part I.C. 1.
34. Before the Committee On Commerce, Science And Transportation United States
Senate, 108th Cong. 3 (June 16, 2004) (testimony of Hon. Stan Wise, Commissioner,
Georgia Public Service Commission, and President, National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners), at http://www.naruc.org/associations/1773/files/
wisevoiptestimony04.pdf [hereinafter Testimony of Stan Wise].
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apply. 35
NARUC has shifted from looking at salient technical features to whether
the service provider has market power. Nothing within the Functional
Approach provides support for or guidance on a market power analysis.
These concerns come from outside the Functional Approach.
iii. The Full Policy Circle: Missouri & California
a. Missouri
The Missouri Public Service Commission ("MoPSC") staff released
the VolP Industry Task Force Report36 in which the staff conducted an
extensive review of VoIP policy. The MoPSC VoIP Report is impressive in
the depth of its analysis. The staff reviewed FCC precedent, examined
policy concerns, and recommended an implementation.
37
The MoPSC staff initiates the MoPSC VoIP Report by rejecting a
straw man argument:
VoIP telephony is unlike traditional telephone service in at least one
significant respect. Although both traditional telephony and VolP
telephony utilize digital services, the transmission medium of VolP
uses Internet protocol (IP) as a transport technology, whereas
traditional telephony uses time division multiplexing (TDM) as a
transport technology.
38
No other relevant distinction is noted. Missouri is implicitly engaged in a
repudiation of the mythical Technical Approach. Where the Technical
Approach bases policy outcome upon this distinction, the Missouri staff
suggests that (a) this is the only distinction, (b) this distinction is trivial,
and (c) therefore, policy must be based on something else (where that
something else-which will be identified fifty pages later, after the staff
tells you what harm VoIP can cause-is the Functional Approach).
The staff moves on to examine how VoIP might impact Missouri.
"The following five impacts have been identified: (1) sales tax revenues,
(2) Relay Missouri funding, (3) E-9-1-1 funding, (4) regulatory assessment
35. Id.
36. VoIP INDUSTRY TASK FORCE, MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, A STUDY OF
VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL IN MISSOURI (Mar. 30, 2004), at
http://www.psc.state.mo.us/teleco/voip-task-force_%20report.pdf [hereinafter MoPSC
VoIP REPORT].
37. A Study of Voice over Internet Protocol, Order Establishing Case, Case No. TW-
2004-0324, (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Feb. 3, 2004), at http://www.psc.state.mo.us/
teleco/VOIPOrder.pdf; The Missouri Public Service Commission, Industry Workshop
Meetings (accessed Aug. 23, 2004), at http://www.psc.state.mo.us/VOIPMeetings.asp.
38. MoPSC VoIP REPORT, supra note 36, at I.
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funding, and (5) local exchange carrier revenue impact." 39 According to the
staff, the impact-the policy concern-is a threat to revenue.
Having identified the policy concern, the MoPSC VoIP Report now
asks the direct question: Is VoIP a "telephone service." Applying the
Functional Approach, the staff clarifies, "VolP is typically a two-way
connection that allows people to communicate. To the extent it offers the
same or similar functions as traditional telecommunications services, or is a
complement to POTS, it is 'phone service."' 40 Notice how broad this is.
The function is identified as "two-way connection that allows people to
communicate.",4 1 Anything that is the same, similar, or a complement to this
function should, according to the staff, fall into the regulated "phone
service" bucket. This could include Vonage, Skype, gamers using VoP, e-
mail, IM, walkie-talkies, and a conversation in the park. In order to ensure
that a threat to revenue is mitigated, use of these same, similar, or
complementary services would also have to be regulated in order to
preserve revenue generation.
b. California
California approached VoP policy with a curious history. First, the
Public Utility Commission ("PUC") sent letters out to VoW service
providers informing them that they were telecommunications services and
must register with the State.42 Then the PUC held a hearing to consider
whether this was in fact correct.43 Finally, the PUC released an
investigation to seek comment on whether this was true, tentatively
confirming that VolP service providers are telecommunications services. 44
39. Id. at 33. Having identified revenue as the concern and a broad Functional
Approach, the staff later identifies an encyclopedia of obligations under which any identical,
similar, or complementary service should fall: unbundling, universal service, certification,
quality of service, tariff filings, directory listing, consumer safeguards, access charges,
intercarrier compensation, interconnection, UNEs, 911, CALEA, Homeland Security,
Patriot Act, and telephone numbers. Id. at 54-86.
40. Id. at 53.
41. Id.
42. CALIFORNIA PUC, VOlP PRESENTATION Nov. 03, slide 11 (Nov. 13, 2003), at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/static/lndustry/telco/voippresentationnov03.pdf [hereinafter CAL.
STAFF PRESENTATION]. See also Ben Charny, California to regulate VoIP providers, CNET
News.com (Sept. 30, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-7352-5084711 .html.
43. The staff presentation does not indicate that the staff made any specific
recommendation to the PUC, but the presentation did note that the impact of VolP on
universal service is projected to be up to $407 million by 2008, and that VolP does not pay
access charges, provide E91 1 services, provide access to traffic by law enforcement, or
obtain numbers under the NANP. CAL. STAFF PRESENTATION, supra note 42, slide 5.
44. Order Instituting Investigation on the Commission's Own Motion to Determine the
Extent to which the Public Utility Telephone Service Known as Voice over Internet
Protocol Should Be Exempted from Regulatory Requirements, Order Instituting
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Implementing a Functional Approach,45 the Commission tentatively
concluded that "VOIP service[s] interconnected with the PSTN [Public
Switched Telephone Network] are public utilities offering a telephone
service subject to our regulatory authority. 46 According to California law,
a "telephone corporation" is any company "owning, controlling, operating,
or managing any telephone line for compensation.... The California
definition of "line" is expansive. 48 It includes "all conduits, ducts, poles,
wires, cables, instruments, and appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures,
and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in
connection with or to facilitate communication by telephone, whether such
communication is had with or without the use of transmission wires. 49
Without specifying what aspect of a Vonage-style service falls within this
definition, the Commission tentatively concluded "to the extent that a VoIP
provider holds itself out to the public to offer for a fee voice telephony on a
local or intrastate basis, it appears to qualify as a public utility telephone
corporation in California."5 °
Like Missouri, California reviewed policy concerns which provide the
rationale for any possible regulation. The Commission's identified policy
concerns and objectives were, like Missouri, threats to revenue. The
Commission noted "given current VoIP penetration rates, between $183
and $407 million in revenue will no longer be available to support
California's five statutorily mandated universal service programs....
The Commission also notes impact on access charges, public safety,
consumer protection, and numbering resources.
Investigation (Cal. PUC, Feb. 11, 2003), at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/published/agenda-
decision/33960.htm [hereinafter Order Instituting Investigation].
45. Id. at 5. ("Our preliminary analysis suggests that similar to federal law, it is the
functional nature of the service offered, not the technology used to deploy the service that
determines whether a service qualifies as a public utility service under state law.").
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id.
48. New York also has an expansive definition of a "line." See discussion infra Part
I.F.l.
49. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 233 (West 2005). In other words, you do not need to own,
control, operate, or manage a line in plain English in order to legally "own, control, operate,
or manage a line."Id. A significant distinction between a Vonage-style service and ILEC
services is just this point, that Vonage offers only an application service; the "line" must be
acquired from some third party. To put it a different way, taken to logical completion, the
real estate company that rents land to a telephone carrier is by law a "telephone company"
and falls under Commission regulation.
50. Order Instituting Investigations, supra note 44, at 4-5. But cf. 47 U.S.C. § 153(46)
(2000) ("The term 'telecommunications service' means the offering of telecommunications
for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available
directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used.").
51. Order Instituting Investigations, supra note 44, at 7.
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c. The Full Circle
The efforts of Missouri and California are noteworthy. The thesis of
this Article is that decision makers are obsessed with policy
implementation (approaches) and fail to recognize policy objectives. In
both the Missouri Report and the California Investigation, the
Commissions identified policy concerns (generally, a threat to revenue) and
then considered how that policy ought to be implemented. These are unique
cases where the question, "does the implementation produce outcomes
consistent with policy objectives?" can be properly answered. If the policy
objective is protection of revenue, then regulating anything that could be
used as a substitute for that revenue source could be an appropriate
approach/implementation.
b. Cases-in-Controversies
Three jurisdictions applied the Functional Approach in controversies:
Minnesota, New York, and Washington. Minnesota is intriguing in that
both the state commission and the federal district court applied the
Functional Approach, yet yielded different outcomes-demonstrating
Vonage-style fact patterns as a middle ground of regulatory instability. A
New York case concerning Vonage is not included in this section because
New York also employs the Technical Approach and the Market Approach
and, thus, is included in the Hybrid Approach section.
i. Minnesota
A conflict in Minnesota became headline news in 2003.52 The
Minnesota Department of Commerce filed a complaint arguing that Vonage
was operating as a telecommunications service without state certification.
In resolving the dispute, the Minnesota Commission presented one page of
deliberations 53 in which it indicated that it would apply the Legal
Approach.54 This was, however, difficult, as Minnesota law did not provide
52. See, e.g., Ben Chamy, Minnesota: Phone rules apply to VoIP, CNET News.com
(Aug. 21 2003), at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_2-5066652.html; Ashley Grant, Judge:
Internet phone regulation could slow Net's expansion, USA TODAY (Oct. 17, 2003),
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2003-10-17-netphone-ruling-
logicx.htm ; W. David Gardner, Minnesota Judge: VolP is Unregulated Data, TECHWEB
(Oct. 8, 2003), at http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB20031008S00 17.
53. Complaint of the Minnesota Department of Commerce Against Vonage Holding
Corp Regarding Lack of Authority to Operate in Minnesota, Order Finding Jurisdiction and
Requiring Compliance, Dkt. No. P-6214/C-03-108, at 8 (Minn. PUC Sept. 11, 2003), at
http://www.puc.state.mn.us/docs/orders/03-0108.pdf. The order is nine pages long. Online
one page is deliberation; the other pages involve history and a summary of the views of the
parties.
54. Id. at 8 ("This is a legal issue under Minnesota law . .
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a definition for a "telephone service. ' 55 Lacking statutory guidance,
Minnesota conducted an examination of Vonage's service and found that it
is "functionally no different than any other telephone service. 56 The
Commission noted that Vonage offers unlimited calling; Vonage offers
Caller ID, Call Waiting, and Voicemail; subscribers can use an ordinary
touch tone phone with the Vonage service; and the Vonage service
intersects with the PSTN.57
Minnesota's argument is that (a) there is an undefined thing known as
telephone service (b) Vonage functions like telephone service (c) therefore
Vonage is a telephone service. Minnesota also notes that Vonage holds
itself out as, and advertises itself as, a replacement for the current phone
company (a substitute service). Therefore, Minnesota directed Vonage to
comply with state law as a telephone service.58
Lacking guidance from the law on how to analyze VolP, Minnesota
provides no justification for selection of the Functional Approach. 59 It
simply implements it. Minnesota's analysis is interwoven with technical
consideration for what equipment can be plugged into the network, what
networks this service connects with, and what can be done with this
service.
Vonage appealed the decision to federal district court which then
overturned the Minnesota ruling. The court likewise applied the
Functional Approach, but arrived at a different result. Unlike the
Commission, the court reviewed federal authority for precedent and
guidance.61  Examining the FCC's Computer Inquiries and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the court concluded that Vonage's Voice
over Internet application "requires Vonage to 'act on' the format and
55. Id. at 3 ("The statute does not specifically define telephone service."). Also note
that Minnesota does not cite to the Steven's Report's or any other precedent for the
Functional Approach.
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. The Commission seems to reject appeals to federal authority such as the Steven's
Report, stating "[i]t is not necessary for the Commission to determine whether VOIP service
is a telecommunications service or an informational service under federal law, and the
Commission will not do so." Id. at 8.
60. Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993 (D.
Minn. 2003), available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtweb/pdf/D08MNXC/O3-
08475.pdf, afftd, 394 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 2004). But see Press Release, Federal
Communications Commission, FCC Finds that Vonage Not Subject to Patchwork of State
Regulations Governing Telephone Companies (Nov. 9, 2004), at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-254112A1 .pdf (announcing
preemption of Minnesota's jurisdiction over Vonage).
61. Vonage, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 997.
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protocol of the information."'6 2 In applying the four criteria of the Steven's
Report, the court noted that Vonage's service requires unique CPE and
there is a net protocol conversion from VoIP to PSTN. Functionally, the
court concluded, Vonage was providing computer-to-computer service or
computer-to-phone service, but it never functionally provided phone-to-
phone service. 63 The court went "under the hood" to look at the specific
components of the service and observed that some of the components were
different. Therefore, the court concluded that Vonage was an information
service and Minnesota was preempted from regulating it.
The two jurisdictions came out with differing results using the same
approach and the same facts. Neither jurisdiction made a direct appeal to
first principles, addressing why Vonage ought or ought not fall under
regulation. This is a paradigm example of the discomfort jurisdictions have
with middle ground cases; the application appears to function the same, but
the service provider is not the network provider and lacks significant
market power. Traditional market rationale for regulation appears to be
lacking, but social rationale such as 911 or CALEA could still be relevant.
ii. Dial-Around Cases
Several of the headline VoIP confrontations involved "dial-around"
services. In this scenario, the subscriber dials a local access number 64 in
order to access the dial-around service. After a tone, the subscriber dials the
number of the individual the subscriber is seeking to reach. The call is now
on the dial-around service provider's network, who arranges to have the
call transmitted long distance. At the destination, the call is placed back on
a Local Exchange Carrier ("LEC") network that services the destination's
phone number. The VoIP version of dial-around utilizes VoIP somewhere
in the long distance transmission. 65
Five states have considered dial-around VoIP services; two have
62. Id. at 999.
63. Id. at 1000-01 ("Because Vonage never provides phone-to-phone IP telephony (it
only provides computer-to-phone or phone-to-computer IP telephony), from a 'functional
standpoint,' Vonage's service is distinguishable from the scenario the FCC considered to be
telecommunications services.").
64. Dial-around services also utilize "10-10" dialing. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, TELECOMMUNICATIONS GLOSSARY 8 (1998), at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-247863A2.pdf.
65. But see Washington Exch. Carrier Ass'n v. LocalDial Corp., Final Order Granting
Motions for Summary Determination, Dkt. No. UT-031472 at 11 (Wash. Utils. & Transp.
Comm'n, June 11, 2004), at http://www.wutc.wa.gov/rms2.nsf/ [hereinafter LocalDial].
"For a call from Seattle to Spokane or from Olympia to Bellingham, this whole process of
converting the call from TDM [time-division multiplexing] to IP and back to TDM again
occurs in the room at the Westin Building." Id.
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found that the service is a telecommunications service and three have66676
reached no conclusion. New York67 and Washington 68 faced complaints
filed by LECs that VolP dial-around services were not certified to provide
service and were failing to pay access charges. Applying the Steven's
Report four criteria,69 New York and Washington found: the services hold
themselves out in their advertisements as telephone services;70 they do not
require the use of different CPE; the calls originate and terminate calls on
the PSTN; and, no net protocol conversion takes place. 7 1 Both states
concluded that the VoIP dial-around services were functionally identical to
traditional long distance service 72 and imposed identical burdens on the
PSTN as other interexchange carrier ("IXC") services. 7 3 Therefore, both
states concluded that the services were telecommunications services which,
specifically, owe access charges.
New York considered and concluded that the Functional Approach is
the proper approach to apply, stating:
The FCC stated that this functional approach is consistent with
Congress's direction that the classification of a provider should not
66. See Petition of CNM Networks, Inc. for declaratory statement that CNM's phone-
to-phone IP telephony is not "telecommunications" and that CNM is not a
"telecommunications company" subject to Florida Public Service Commission jurisdiction,
Order Denying Petition for Declaratory Statement, Dkt. No. 021061-TP (Fla. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, Dec. 31, 2002), at http://www.psc.state.fl.us/psc/dockets/index.cfm?event=
transferFile&fileSize=328312&fileName=02%5C 14104%2D02%5C 14104%2D02%2EPDF
&fileTimeStamp=01062003 [hereinafter CNM]; BEK Comm. Coop. v. SmartNET, Inc.,
Notice of Hearing, Case No. PU-2967-03-666 (N.D. PSC Jan. 28, 2004) (investigation
pending), at http://www.psc.state.nd.us/jurisdiction/pud/telecom/notices/03-666a.pdf; Or.
Exch. Carrier Ass'n v. LocalDial Corp., Order, Order No. 04-358 (Or. PUC June 25, 2004),
at http://www.puc.state.or.us/orders/2004ords/04%2D35 8 .pdf (dismissing as moot because
Washington proceeding against LocalDial was resolved).
67. Compl. of Frontier Co. of Rochester Against DataNet Corp. Concerning Alleged
Refusal to Pay Intrastate Carrier Access Charges, Order Requiring Payment of Intrastate
Access Charges, Case No. 01-C-1119 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, May 31, 2002), at
http://www3.dps.state.ny.us/pscweb/WebFileRoom.nsf/Web/4B 14A963E31B 14FE85256D
F 1007568D2/$File/doc 1 1729.pdf [hereinafter DataNet].
68. LocalDial, supra note 66.
69. Both state jurisdictions make substantial reference to federal precedent. DataNet,
supra note 67, at 6-9 (referring to the Steven's Report four criteria as a "functional
approach"); LocalDial, supra note 66, at 19-24 (reviewing the Computer Inquiries to the
more recent FCC AT&T VolP decision).
70. See the LocalDial Web site, at http://www.bluee5.com/localdial/ (accessed Apr. 1,
2005). "LocalDial provides unlimited long distance calling for a low flat rate. With
LocalDial you can talk as long as you want, anytime you want, anywhere in the 48
continental United States. LocalDial is an easy-to-use, supplemental phone service for
domestic long distance calling." Id.
71. DataNet, supra note 67, at 8.
72. Id.; LocalDial, supra note 66, at 27.
73. LocalDial, supra note 66, at 27.
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depend on the type of facilities used. A telecommunications service is
a telecommunications service regardless of whether it is provided
using wireline, wireless, cable, satellite, or some other infrastructure.
Its classification dePpe ds rather on the nature of the service being
offered to customers.
The affirmation of the Functional Approach is achieved by reference to
congressional intent. Of course, the congressional intent here is a negative
postulation: policy outcome should not depend on facility type. Okay, this
begs the question of what it should depend upon; the congressional intent
cited does not inform us.
The dial-around cases are fringe cases that do not cause much policy
consternation. The Functional Approach and the Market Approach are in
alignment. Functionally, VolP dial services are largely indistinguishable
from other dial-around services. In terms of the market, the entrance of the
VolP dial-around services causes no alteration in the competitive market,
and neither the current players nor the entrants exhibit significant market
power. In these easy-question cases, one would not expect the decision
maker to exhibit anxiety concerning the proper approach, leading to a
rigorous review of policy and approaches. All analytical roads lead to the
same destination.
3. The Functional Approach Observations
The above examples of states' utilization of the Functional Approach
lead to the following observations.
a. Legal Precedent
The Functional Approach provides a degree of assurance. This is an
approach articulated by the FCC developed out of the precedent of the
Computer Inquiries and court cases discerning the definition of a
"telecommunications carrier." A state would feel a degree of comfort
applying quality precedent. This approach produces a definitive answer.
The state might hope reliance on such precedent will substantiate its
decision against appeal (this has, however, not been the case).
b. Function versus Under-the-Hood
Different applications of the Functional Approach reveal a tension
over what is meant by the Functional Approach. As presented by the
Steven's Report, the decision maker looks under the hood at the technical
components of the service. But this seems contrary to advocacy of the
Functional Approach as an alternative to the Technical Approach. The
74. DataNet, supra note 67, at 7.
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Functional Approach is said to resolve policy outcomes based on
functionality and not the components under the hood that produced that
functionality. Indeed, some of the states' arguments seem to pick up on this
and stay high at the functionality level. Most others do not. Of course, the
danger of a high functional analysis is that it may capture things (such as
Voice over Instant Messaging) that may or may not be desired to be
included.
c. Circular Justification
Some advocates of the Functional Approach are seen to justify their
approach in a circular or self-referential manner. In response to the
question, "why is the Functional Approach correct?" the answer is given,
"because like things should be regulated the same." The Functional
Approach is "like things should be regulated the same"; yet the rationale
presented is likewise "like things should be regulated the same." The
rationale for the approach is identical to the approach itself. This does not
get us too far.
What is lacking is a reference to first principles; why should the
regulation exist. What are the policy concerns and objectives?
The Functional Approach does not justify its criteria (nor should it be
expected to). A criterion of the FCC's Functional Approach is whether a
service uses new or unique CPE. What difference should this make? If the
phone functions in all manners the same, but there is some mystery black
box in the middle, why should this change things? What about mobile
phones, Time Warner Cable Information Service ("TWCIS") phones over
coax cable, or Integrated Services Digital Network ("ISDN") Phones? The
CPE varies; so does policy outcome. CPE acts (sort of) as a demarcation
point along the border between phones with policy concerns and phones
lacking those policy concerns. But the presence or absence of the CPE
itself does not enlighten us as to what the policy concern is. The rationale
for different policy outcomes emanates from elsewhere.
To be clear, this is not a fault or a criticism. This is to clarify and
distinguish policy from approach. Approaches implement policy; they are
not the policy itself. To understand the "why," one must go beyond the
"how."
C. The Technical Approach
The Functional Approach is regularly juxtaposed against a mythical
Technical Approach. 75 The Technical Approach is described as an "under-
75. See, e.g., Order Instituting Investigation, supra note 44, at 5 ("Our preliminary
analysis suggests that similar to federal law, it is the functional nature of the service offered,
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the-hood" 76 approach where the analysis looks specifically at a single
component in order to determine policy outcome (in the case of VolP,
whether VolP is present). The Technical Approach is caricatured as
fundamentally flawed. Why should policy favor a particular technology,
the argument goes.
There are a few problems. First, the alternative, the Functional
Approach, is a Technical Approach as well. The difference is a finger count
of the number of components considered. The selection of the one or the
several salient components would appear to be equally arbitrary or artificial
in either approach. Second, no jurisdiction embraces the mythological
Technical Approach. There is essentially no jurisdiction which has
identified VolP as a single favored component that determines policy
outcome. Finally, the argument "why should policy outcome be based on a
technology" confuses implementation with objectives.
Approaches implement policy objectives using artificial frameworks.
Why not base the approach on technology? Base it on whatever you like.
All approaches are artificial. It is necessary to identify some marker
between those things covered by a policy and those not. As long as the
outcome is consistent with the objectives, the approach is valid. However,
basing an approach on technology is not the same as, and should not be
confused with, basing a policy on technology.
1. Florida
The one exception emanates out of an odd history in Florida. Florida
was confronted with a VoTP dial-around service that was of the belief that it
did not owe access charges. It petitioned the Florida Public Utility
Commission ("PUC") for a declaratory ruling. Florida dismissed the
petition on the grounds that such a proceeding would establish broad-
reaching VoIP policy and therefore should not be resolved in a declaratory
ruling. The PUC directed its staff to hold hearings on the subject, but
before the PUC could act, the legislature closed down the discussion with a
broad declaration that "the provision of voice-over-internet protocol
(VOIP) free of unnecessary regulation, regardless of the provider, is in the
public interest. ' 78 This legislation looks under the hood and if the single-
component VoIP is present, that component seems to determine policy
outcome.
not the technology used to deploy the service that determines whether a service qualifies as
a public utility service under state law."); MOPSC VolP REPORT, supra note 36, at 1 (noting
technical distinction and dismissing it as trivial).
76. Testimony of Stan Wise, supra note 34.
77. CNM, supra note 67.
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 364.01(3) (West Supp. 2005).
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D. The Layered Model of Regulation
The Layered Model of Regulation is presented as a dramatic
alternative to the Functional Approach. 79 The argument is that instead of
pursuing an analysis of the technical characteristics of a service, the
Layered Model separates distinct areas of policy concern. The Layered
Model divides the policy landscape into (1) physical network, (2) logical or
computer networks, (3) applications, and (4) content.80
In terms of communications policy, classical policy concerns
addressed market power. AT&T became a government-sanctioned
monopoly and thereby had market power. Computer network services lack
market power 81 and are dependent upon physical network services, such as
AT&T, that have the ability and the incentive to take advantage of market
power to the detriment of the computer network services market. The
Layered Model has been applied to this to distinguish the market power of
physical networks and their relationship to computer networks services,
application services, and content. Notice here that the layers are markets,
layered upon one another, and policy outcome is based upon the way those
markets interact. While the FCC has never adopted the Layered Model of
Regulation, the Computer Inquiry policy would appear to track this
framework.82
79. See, e.g., Douglas C. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model for
Telecommunications Policy, Telecommunications Policy Research Conference (2002), at
http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/archive-search-abstract.cfm?PaperlD=95; Kevin Werbach, A
Layered Model for Internet Policy, I J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37 (2002); Robert M.
Entman, Rapporteur, Transition to an IP Environment, THE ASPEN INSTrIUTE (2001), at
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/enrO4/enrO4.pdf.
80. The Layered Model of Regulation should not be confused with the layers of the
Internet stack or of the Open Systems Interconnection ("OSI") stack. While there may be
similarities-or perhaps inspirations-the Layered Model is a division along recognized
zones of policy concerns. The advocates of the Layered Model argue that implementation of
this model facilitates recognition that, for example, market policy concerns of the physical
network services layer do not necessarily apply to the applications services layer. Likewise,
intellectual property concerns of the content layer are perhaps best dealt with at the content
layer and not at the physical network layer.
81. Computer I concluded that as the computer market was competitive, regulation is
not merited:
Applying these standards to the record before us we conclude that the offering of
data processing services is essentially competitive and that, except to the limited
extent hereinafter set forth, there is no public interest requirement for regulation
by government of such activities. Thus, there is ample evidence that data
processing services of all kinds are becoming available in larger volume and that
there are no natural or economic barriers to free entry into the market for these
services. The number of data processing bureaus, time sharing systems, and
specialized information services is steadily increasing and there are no indications
that any of these markets are threatened with monopolization.
Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 10, para. 20.
82. See Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communication Commission's
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While the Layered Model is presented as an extreme alternative to the
Functional Approach, it is not as different as it might seem. Both
approaches are artificial implementations of policy objectives. Both are
implemented through technical criteria, although the two have different
technical perspectives of the same horse. The true superiority of one
approach over the other should be determined not on some innate nature of
the approach, but whether the approach successfully produces outcomes
consistent with policy objectives.
Few jurisdictions have declared that they embrace the Layered Model.
However, a number of jurisdictions implicitly follow the model, making a
distinction between physical network and applications. This distinction
recognizes the uncoupling of the voice application from the physical
network. This uncoupling removes the voice application from the physical
network market where the company can use network market power to
influence the application market. It places the voice application in a
competitive market that is more akin to the e-mail services market than the
telephone network market.
1. Colorado
Colorado was confronted by a city with a troubled conscience. The
City of Cortez constructed a fiber optic network known as the Cortez
Community Network ("CCN"). This network received local transmissions
from Qwest, aggregated them, and then transported them to other places,
including Denver (potentially intrastate long distance). The City of Cortez
did not itself offer voice services, but was of the conviction that some of its
customers might be tempted. Therefore, the City of Cortez modified its
Acceptable Use Policy to require tempted customers to receive certification
prior to using VoIP. The city then sought dispensation from the• • • 83
Commission that CCN did not itself require certification.
The Colorado Commission concluded that CCN is a private digital
line offering and not within its jurisdiction. The petition for a declaratory
ruling that CCN did not need certification for possible third party voice
services was therefore granted.
84
This Colorado case is a fascinating inverse confrontation. Normally
Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167 (2003), available at http://law.indiana.edu/
fclj/pubs/v55/no2/cannon.pdf.
83. The Petition of The City of Cortez. Colo., A Colo. Mun. Corp. And A Home Rule
City, For A Decl. Order that Certain Data Comm. Servs. Provided by The City Do Not Need
Certificates Provided by The Comm'n, Order Granting Petition For Declaratory Order,
Dkt. No. 03D-072T (Colo. PUC May 21, 2003), at http://www.dora.state.co.us/puc/
decisions/2003/C03-065 1_03D-072T.doc.
84. Id. at para 4.
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the physical network is a regulated carrier, and the question is whether an
application service should also be regulated. In this case, the physical
network is not a regulated carrier regardless of the status of the applications
service, with the Commission distinguishing between the physical network
and applications. The PUC concludes with a curious statement:
In addition, the City's representation that it will not permit providers
that are uncertified (by the Commission) to use the CCN to offer VOIP
services persuades us that its 89wnership and operation of the CCN is
not subject to our jurisdiction.
Does this mean that the PUC is envisioning regulated telephony application
services over a non-regulated physical network? Alternatively, is the
Commission saying that something has to be regulated? If the application is
regulated, then does the network need not be? But if the application is not
regulated, then does the physical network need to be (the non-regulation of
CCN is conditioned upon the regulation of any possible voice service)? The
Commission's decision is a short four paragraphs and does not expound on
rationale so much as it disposes of what appears to be a simple case. The
decision reveals a perception of network and applications as distinct, but
seems to muddle the implications of those distinctions.
2. Guam
A policy dispute in Guam constitutes a fascinating historical
throwback. To appreciate this story, one must recall the time prior to
divestiture when AT&T was permitted only to offer basic
telecommunications services and was prohibited from offering information
services.86 To a company prohibited from offering information services,
everything looks like a basic service.
The Guam Telephone Authority ("GTA") is a statutorily created
telephone service. The GTA charter limits it to the provision of telephone
service. 87 GTA thought it would be a good idea to offer Internet service.
Private Guam communications companies disagreed-and filed for an• • 88
injunction. GTA argued that the provision of Internet access was within
its authority, in other words, that Internet access is a telephone service.
The Guam Supreme Court disagreed, 89 making a distinction between
85. Id.
86. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), vacated sub nom. United States v. W.
Elec. Co., 2 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1388 (D.D.C. 1996).
87. Carlson v. Guam Telephone Auth., 2002 Guam 15, para. 9 (Sept. 6, 2002),
available at http://teamsupreme.temp.powweb.com/op2002Guam I5.htm.
88. Id. para. 2.
89. See Guamtel Injunction, at http://www.guamtel.net/injunction.html (last visited
Apr. 20, 2005) (stating that "[a]lthough disappointed with the ruling, GTA will abide by the
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telephone service as "two-way communications of speech" and the
Internet, which is "two-way communication of data. ' 9 ° The court
anticipated that individuals could use telephony applications over the
Internet, but drew a distinction between Internet access service and
applications. The issue before the court was not potential applications and
not the underlying physical network; the issue was GTA's offering of
Internet access service. The fact that VoIP applications exist does not make
the Internet access service itself a telecommunication service. "The access
provided by the ISP and the platform for placing a voice call are too
independent to render the former the equivalent of the latter." 91 The court
concluded that, as Internet access service is not a telephone service, GTA
had exceeded its authority and the service was enjoined; the fact that users
could acquire third party VolP applications did not alter this outcome.
92
In this case, the court recognized as distinct the telephone network, a
computer network (a.k.a. the Internet), and applications. According to the
court, the regulatory classification of one does not implicate the regulatory
classification of another. It is not quite a Layered Model, but the court
perceived application, Internet, and physical network as separate things.
The court also rejected a broad Functional Approach such as the one
articulated by Missouri in which a service that is the same as, similar to, or
a complement to "a two-way connection that allows people to
communicate" is a "phone service."9 3 Simply because something is
functionally a substitute for something else, does not make it that
something else.
Certain types of data transmission services have been characterized as
supplementing telephone service, such as one-way paging systems.
The nexus between these types of services and ordinary telephone
service is readily apparent. By contrast, internet access and internet use
is not logically or inherently seen as supplementing ordinary telephone
service. While it cannot be doubted that internet access allows for
communication which conveniently substitutes or replaces telephonic
communication (such as electronic mail), this is distinct from a service
which supplements or works in conjunction with telephone service.
Internet access service allows for a type of transmission of data and
information that is by-and-large unrelated to ordinary telephone
Court's order.")
90. Carlson, 2002 Guam 15, at para. 41. The court acknowledged that the term
"telephone service" is undefined in the Guam statute. It proceeded to review, but then
rejected federal precedent. "[W]e do not find the distinctions made in the 1996 Act to be
determinative in the instant context .... we must conduct an independent analysis of the
scope of the term 'telephone services' in 12 GCA § 7104(a)." Id. para. 33.
91. Id. para. 41.
92. Id. para. 42.
93. MoPSC VolP Report, supra note 36, at 53.
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service, and therefore does not supplement such service.
94
Mere similarity in function is insufficient, according to the Guam court.
95
3. Layered Model Observations
While advocates of the Functional Approach see an outcome where a
phone is a phone, and Vonage is just like Verizon, advocates of the
Layered Model will scratch their heads. Advocates of the Layered Model
may look at the Functional Approach and conclude that there should be
little difference in the outcome between the two approaches if the
Functional Approach were applied properly.
The Functional Approach, as currently implemented, compares
application to application. However, when contrasting Verizon to Vonage,
that is not complete. The functionality sold by Verizon is physical network
transport coupled with application. The functionality sold by Vonage is just
the application. Given the relative significance of physical network
transport, and the historic concern that the physical network is where
market power exists, the Functional Approach advocates fail to provide a
rationale for selectively disregarding the physical network. Functionally,
Verizon and Vonage are not the same.
E. Market Principles
There are a few instances where the states have made direct appeal to
first principles, policy concern over markets, without discussions of
implementations. These generally involve situations that are not case-in-
controversies where Commissions were free to pontificate on the desired
construction of VolP policy. Both instances cited below reference the
Nascent Services doctrine. 
6
1. Colorado
At the end of 2003, Colorado closed a year-long investigation of VolP
citing the FCC's announced VolP proceeding as the rationale. 97 The
94. Carlson, 2002 Guam 15, at para. 43 (citations omitted).
95. Nevertheless, the court's argument here too seems Platonic. A broad Functional
Approach is rejected, not because it fails to implement good policy, but because by the
nature of the things themselves, the broad Functional Approach does not appear coherent.
Why is Internet access not the functional equivalent to telephone service? Because it is "by-
and-large unrelated to ordinary telephone service." Id.
96. See Commissioner Kathleen Q. Abernathy, The Nascent Services Doctrine,
Remarks Before the Federal Communications Bar Association New York Chapter (July 11,
2002), at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Abernathy/2002/spkqa2l7.html.
97. The Investigation Into Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) Services, Order
Closing Docket, Dkt. No. 03M-220T (Colo. PUC Dec. 17, 2003), at
http://www.dora.state.co.us/puc/decisions/2004/CO4-0004_03M-220T.doc.
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Chairman of the Commission's concurrence articulated his views
concerning the inapplicability of legacy market regulation on new VoIP
services:
Despite the efforts of some states, it is my view that VolP should not
be regulated like traditional telephone service. Existing regulations-
including rate caps, tariff filings, and service quality obligations-were
promulgated to police the behavior of monopoly telephone providers.
It makes no sense to impose price or service quality controls on
fledgling competitors who will get few customers if they offer high
prices or bad service quality.
We should not doom a nascent competitive industry via regulatory
overkill. If there is an attempt at heavy-handed regulation, those
companies who obey-by paying taxes, subsidies, and intercarrier
charges-will quickly be undercut by a netherworld of entrepreneurs
who do not. Companies who do not 9 bey will locate in more friendly
states or, failing that, other countries.
Chairman Sopkin articulated his vision of policy goals and objectives. He
did not articulate his vision of an approach in order to implement that
policy.
2. Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania PUC initiated an investigation in May 200399 with
general articulations of VoIP, but also pointing specifically to the advent of
Vonage as an impetus for the proceeding. Pennsylvania indicated that it
was merely seeking to inform its judgment, stating "[a]s a threshold matter,
this Commission must decide whether we have jurisdiction to regulate
VoIP service in this Commonwealth, and if jurisdiction exists, whether we
should exercise it."
10 0
One year later, Pennsylvania declared that it would not take
regulatory action, instead deferring to the FCC's IP Enabled Services
Proceeding.'0' This was achieved by a Commissioner's motion of "no
action"; it did not in fact close the investigation and did say that PUC staff
would continue to monitor VoIP.
If regulation is too oppressive while a technology is still developing, it
could result in a dampening of the introduction or growth of that
technology. Although there are instances where regulatory intervention
98. Id. paras. 6-7 (Gregory E. Sopkin, Chairman, concurring statement).
99. Investigation into Voice over Internet Protocol as a Jurisdictional Service, Order,
Dkt. No. M-00031707 (Pa. PUC May 30, 2003), at http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/
vo133/33-20/965.html.
100. Id. at 1.
101. Investigation into Voice over Internet Protocol as a Jurisdictional Service, Motion of
Commissioner Glen R. Thomas, Dkt. No. M-00031707 (Pa. PUC Apr. 15, 2004), at
http://www.puc.paonline.com/PcDocs/466305.doc.
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is proper (such as market failure or consumer abuse), regulatory
restraint is more pruNpt until such time as the technology is
understood and viable.
Commissioner Thomas also took note of the pending FCC IP Enabled
Services Proceeding, which may clarify VolP policy and the need for the
Commission to further understand the VolP services prior to regulation.
Much like Colorado, Pennsylvania Commissioner Thomas is articulating
clear ruminations concerning policy directions prior to attempting to
construct a policy framework.
F. Hybrid Approaches
Neat academic distinctions between approaches are not the same as
real-world decision making. Some jurisdictions mix approaches, seemingly
selecting the approach of the moment that will produce the desired
outcome. Generally the mixing is mild. In one instance, New York toured
through approaches grappling for a way to resolve the regulatory status of
Vonage.
1. New York: Vonage
A New York ILEC, Frontier Communications, brought a complaint
against Vonage arguing that Vonage is a telecommunications service
operating without authority and specifically alleged that Vonage "is
providing an unsafe and inadequate implementation of 911 calling ... 103
The New York Commission's decision resolving the complaint identified
... . . 104
reliable 911 service as the policy objective, and then applied various
approaches in order to achieve that policy objective with an
implementation that also recognizes the lack of market concerns.
In order to determine if Vonage is subject to state regulation, New
York applied a Technical Approach. Disregarding the early decision of the
Minnesota federal court, 10 5 the New York Commission found that Vonage
102. Id. at 2.
103. Complaint of Frontier Company of Rochester, Inc. Against Vonage Holdings Corp.
Concerning Provision of Local Exchange and Interexchange Telephone Serv. in New York
State in Violation of the Public Service Law, Complaint (N.Y. PSC Sept. 10, 2003),
available at http://www.frontieronline.com/pdf/VonageComplaint.pdf.
104. Complaint of Frontier Telephone of Rochester, Inc. Against Vonage Holdings Corp.
Concerning Provision of Local Exchange and InterExchange Telephone Serv. in New York
State in Violation of the Public Service Law, Order Establishing Balanced Regulatory
Framework for Vonage Holding Corporation, Case No. 03-C-1285 at 15 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n May 21, 2004), at
http://www3.dps.state.ny.us/pscweb/WebFileRoom.nsf/Web/C03561B8303FD80885256E9
B004F8806/$File/03c I 285.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter Vonage Holding Corp. Order].
105. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.b.i.
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is a telecommunications service subject to state regulation. Under New
York state law, a "telephone corporation" is defined as
"every corporation.. .owning, operating or managing any telephone
line or part of telephone line ,used in the conduct of the business of
affording telephonic communication for hire.,'
1 6
Although one might expect a "line" to be defined essentially as the wire
over which communications occur,107 New York defined a "line" as
including:
receivers, transmitters, instruments, machines, appliances and all
devices,.. apparatus, property and routes used, operated or owned by
any telephone corporation t9 ojacilitate the business of affording
telephonic communication....
In other words, a "line" could be the electronics at the end of a wire, even
where the electronics are independent of the wire. As Vonage owns a
media gateway, this constituted "owning a line" to New York, and
therefore Vonage is a telephone company under state law. 109 This is an
examination under the hood for a particular component. If that component
exists, it determines policy outcomes. In this case, the magic component is
a media gateway.
In order to determine whether New York was preempted by federal
jurisdiction, New York applied a Functional Approach. Citing the
definition of "telecommunications service" and "information service" in
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the FCC's analysis in the
Steven's Report, New York concluded that there is no change in form or
content of the conversation, no ability to interact with or manage stored
data, and no net protocol conversion.II
In order to determine what regulations should now apply, the
Commission applied Market Principles.
As Vonage is a relatively small competitive provider of local
exchange and interexchange services, it should be subject to, at most, the
same limited regulatory regime to which comparable circuit switched
competitive carriers are currently subject in New York. However, because
we recognize the potential impact of this emerging technology on facilities-
106. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 2(17) (Consol. 2004) (emphasis added).
107. But cf NAT'L COMM. Sys. TECH. & STANDARDS Div., GENERAL SERVS. ADMIN.,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: GLOSSARY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS TERMS FED STD 1037C
(1996), at http://glossary.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/. ("line: 1. A physical medium for
transferring electrical or electromagnetic energy from one point to another for purposes of
communications. (188) 2. A land line. 3. A metallic medium used for the transmission of
electrical power.").
108. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 2(18) (Consol. 2004).
109. Vonage Holding Corp. Order, supra note 106, at 10.
110. Id. at 12.
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based competition, we will move cautiously, so as not to hinder its
development. Consequently, the company may seek permanent or
temporary waivers of any of those requirements it deems to be
inappropriate in its circumstance or with which it is not readily able to
comply. I'
New York concludes that while it must regulate Vonage, this
regulation should be appropriate and minimal.
New York goes from Technical Approach to Functional Approach
and finally to Market Principles. The identified concern that New York
grapples with is reliable 911 service. It's not going to get that one identified
concern unless it sticks Vonage under the whole regulatory regime. Having
done so, it seeks to back Vonage out of the regime as far as possible based
on market principles. Competing policy principles are contending for
outcome; New York seeks to achieve these policy goals by an
uncomfortable eclectic tour through approaches."1
2
II. OBSERVATIONS
Having completed a survey of state VolP precedent, this part of the
project seeks to sort the different approaches and analyze results. This led
to an examination of the differing policy implementations, whether policy
objectives were considered, and whether the implementation met policy
objectives. The question in this review is not, what are the proper policy
objectives, but whether jurisdictions are engaging a process that will
produce coherent policy.
A. The Muddled Process: Goals First
Automatic implementation of established approaches will not
necessarily produce results consistent with policy goals and objectives. In
new situations, decision makers need to return to first principles. Critiquing
the viability of approaches is incoherent until one knows what policy the
approach seeks to implement. If the first principle is market power, then
companies lacking market power fall outside the scope. If the first principle
is protection of revenue, then regulating alternative services might ensure
that revenue is collected regardless of the service utilized. Whether an
111. Id. at 17.
112. Once again, a federal district court was unpersuaded that the PSC had authority to
regulate Vonage. On June 30, 2004, a federal district court temporarily enjoined
enforcement of New York's decision. The court set the date for the hearing on the
permanent injunction in January 2005, leaving ample opportunity for the FCC or Congress
to resolve the issue and take it out of the hands of the court. See Ben Charny, Vonage beats
back New York ruling, CNET News.com, Jun. 30, 2004, at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-
1103_2-5253841.html.
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approach is the proper framework cannot be divined until first principles
are resolved.
B. Approaches Are Artificial Frameworks
An approach is an artificial framework implemented to identify that
which falls within a policy and that which does not. The demarcation points
along the borders provide the utility of distinguishing one side of the border
from the other. These demarcation points, however, do not reveal why they
are where they are. It matters not what these demarcation points are, as
long as they successfully implement policy. The demarcation points are not
to be confused with the policy itself: they are not what the policy is based
upon, rather they are how the policy is implemented.
C. Market versus Social Concerns
Policy objectives motivating telecommunications regulation can be
divided into two groups: market and social concerns. Classical regulatory
concerns have addressed telecommunication utility monopolies and their
position in the market. It concerned the provision of service by the
monopoly to consumers and to potential competitors in other markets, and
the entrance of monopolies into other markets (i.e., CPE retail sale,
computer sale, and enhanced services). As time went on, social concerns
also became regulatory mandates. These concerns included wiretap
authority, access by individuals with disabilities, and 911 service. The set
of regulatees who fell within the scope of market concerns happened to be
the same set of regulatees who fell within the scope of social concerns.
The review of state VoIP precedent reveals an evolution in policy
concerns. Social concerns continue to be an underlying justification for
regulation while market concerns have diminished. In situations where
states articulated policy objectives, they articulated social concerns. New
York identified reliable 911 service. California and Missouri identified
universal service. Other concerns have included consumer protections.
However, nowhere in the articulated policy concerns is there discussion of
market power, market entrance, or anti-competitive behavior. These
traditional policy objectives that were the primary principles initiating this
regulatory path appear lacking from current discussions.
D. On-Off Switches
The distinction between social concerns and market concerns, and
regulatory history where those regulatees which fell under social concerns
and those regulatees that fell under market concerns were the same, has led
to a modern conundrum. Those two sets no longer remain synonymous.
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Social policy may remain a concern when market policy is not. However,
as history did not distinguishe the two sets of concerns, a decision maker is
faced with a dilemma of an On-Off Switch. Either an entity in question is
regulated (On Switch) or it is not (Off Switch).
Decision makers generally lack the ability to regulate for certain
purposes and not others. Regulation of telecommunications services
currently encompasses a wide range of concerns. If the decision maker
identifies only one obligation as absolutely necessary and in the public
interest, the decision maker is obligated to impose the entire framework to
achieve it. 113 If the decision maker wants to turn the switch to the Off
position, all regulatory concerns must first be satisfied. This creates a
dilemma where the decision maker has limited leeway in designing
regulatory solutions in a new environment.
E. Talking Past Each Other
The On-Off Switch creates a dialogue in which the participants are
talking past each other. Those advocates who focus on market power
contend that regulation is not needed. Those advocates who focus on social
concerns contend that regulation is needed. However, generally no one is
arguing that market concerns justify further regulation, and no one is
arguing that social concerns need not be satisfied.
In other words, there is general agreement on policy. Market concerns
do not justify regulation; social concerns should be satisfied (and may
require regulation). Yet even though there exists rough consensus on policy
objectives, there is dramatic division in approach due to the On-Off Switch.
The half full glass is neither empty nor full, yet it must be one or the other.
As a result, the two sets of advocates talk past each other: they
advocate opposing positions, yet lack opposing policy objectives. Partly,
this is a product of the dilemma of the On-Off Switch. Partly it is the
product of a muddled discussion which confuses
implementation/approaches with policy objectives.
III. CONCLUSION
A refrain in policy rhetoric is, "why should policy be based on
technology?" Decision makers are religiously warned against the evils of
technologically biased policy. This line of rhetoric, however, confuses
implementation with policy. Rarely can an instance be found where the
113. This situation was seen in New York where the Commission identified reliable 911
service as a compelling concern, turned the regulatory switch on, but then tried using
alternative analysis to back out of further regulation of VoIP providers. See supra note 106
and accompanying text.
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policy of a jurisdiction is that the existence of a particular technology is the
rationale for policy outcome.
At some point in the beginning of policy time, a policy creator
ponders existence and resolves that action is needed. Policy objectives and
goals are conceived. Having determined why the decision maker might act,
the decision maker then ponders how to act. The regulator constructs an
artificial framework to implement the goals and objectives. It is one thing
to say "communications service providers with market power must be
regulated in order to ensure proper delivery of service and to thwart anti-
competitive behavior by the service provider in other markets." It is
another thing to articulate the boundary between the provider with market
power and other service providers. How do I know that I have a horse and
not an elephant? The technical description that answers this question is not
itself the reason "why" the policy exists in the first place.
The process by which policy is created has been misplaced. Decision
makers have existed for so long in the context of implementation that
implementation has been confused with policy. State precedent above
demonstrates the tension of applying a legacy approach, but not being able
to make sense out of novel outcomes. Other examples demonstrate the
circularity of justifying an approach by the approach. Other examples
demonstrate how one must move beyond contrasting one approach to
another without reference to policy objectives.
In a few examples, states articulated policy concerns and
implemented approaches consistent with those objectives. The
appropriateness of the policy concerns might be called into question, but
the question now is properly framed as: Are the identified policy goals,
objectives, and concerns appropriate; not whether it is inherently superior
to examine the horse by its teeth, by its function, or its layers
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